







































Peru has made great progress in reducing poverty and inequality in the past decade along-
side high economic growth. Albeit this progress, the incidence of poverty and inequality
remain high. This paper examines the distributional and poverty impact of the public
tax and transfer system in Peru. It applies an extended income approach that accounts
for the value of publicly-provided health, education and childcare services. Accounting for
public services is important since unequal access to basic services is a main development
challenge for low and middle income countries. We ﬁnd that public social spending reduces
overall inequality by almost 7 Gini points. This reduction is mainly driven by in-kind ben-
eﬁts while the impact of taxation and direct cash transfers is small. Income diﬀerentials
within regions explain approximately four ﬁfths of overall inequality compared to diﬀer-
ences between regions, which explain about one ﬁfth. This ratio remains largely unaﬀected
by public redistribution. Mean levels of welfare vary widely across regions. This is also
because social spending achieves litte poverty reduction. It decreases absolute poverty by
2-3 percentage points in terms of monetary income and up to 9 percentage points or 25%
when accounting for public service use. The largest share of the poor, over 50%, are not
reached by social assistance. To tackle poverty more eﬀectively, transfer levels and cover-
age need to be increased. Current policies seem insuﬃcient to achieve a more equitable
income distribution.
JEL: D31 I30 H53 I38
Keywords: Income distribution, poverty, social protection, public services, non-cash in-
come, Peru
1 Background
Social protection is an eﬀective instrument to address poverty and inequality, and foster
socio-economic development (Kenworthy, 2011). The experience of high income countries
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has shown that the redistributive impact of ﬁscal policy depends to a large extent on the
progressiveness of (targeted) transfers, which account for three quarters of overall redis-
tribution (OECD, 2015). Despite its clear links to securing basic living standards, social
protection has not played a large role in the development discourse until the late 1990s and
has only more recently become recognized as an important instrument to build productive
capacities and reduce the high levels of inequality that developing economies often charac-
terize (Devereux, 2001). Latin America is a region that has historically been characterized
by very high inequality and low levels of social spending. Social insurance funds emerged in
the 1920s and had reached high levels of coverage by the 1970s in pioneering countries such
as Uruguay and Argentina (Barrientos, 2013). However, until recently social protection
systems in most of the region did not go far beyond contributory schemes that extended
to formal workers in urban areas while excluding the larger share of the population. Since
the turn of the century, an expansion of social assistance in the form of means-tested cash
transfers has started to transform welfare states of Latin America. At the same time, in-
equality and poverty have seen a large decrease in the region, albeit remaining at high levels.
Peru resembles the regional trend in many ways. Social insurance funds started to
emerge in the 1940s, but never reached the same levels of coverage as the regional neigh-
bours Chile and Argentina did due to the high levels of informality. Throughout the 1980s,
Peru's ﬁscal situation deteriorated rapidly, leaving it a ﬁnancially broke state in which pub-
lic services were virtually non-existent in large parts of the country. This economic crisis
was fueled by massive political instability and terrorist ﬁghting, particularly in poor and
remote rural areas. The economy started to stabilize again in the mid-1990s and rising
tax revenues created ﬁscal space for a gradual increase of social expenditures. Whilst in
the 1990s these were channeled mostly into targeted infrastructure development and food
aid, more comprehensive social security programmes such as a non-contributory health
insurance and a conditional cash transfer were introduced in 2002 and 2005 respectively.
Through their prioritized expansion in poor regions, these social programmes also con-
tribute to state-building eﬀorts.
The country has achieved a sizeable reduction in poverty and inequality in the past two
decades, not least as a result of high economic growth that led to its advancement into the
group of upper middle income countries1 in 2008. Nonetheless, Peru is still characterized
by a highly unequal distribution of economic resources as typical for the region. Likewise,
poverty remains at almost 50% in rural areas and even in urban areas, it exceeds 15%.
Table 1 shows the trends in iequality and poverty since 2004: poverty has more than halved
from almost 59% in 2004 to less than 23% in 2014 while the Gini index decreased from
0.49 to 0.42 over the same time period. Large disparities persist between urban and rural
areas, and between geographical regions of the country (INEI, 2015a).
Against this background, this paper analyzes the distributional impact of public social
spending in Peru and its eﬀectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality. Poverty and
inequality are usually measured on the basis of disposable household income. Research
has, however, shown that the provision of public services can have a large impact upon
inequality and social mobility. Moreover, their distribution may be very diﬀerent from
that of monetary income sources. For this reason, the Commission on the Measurement
1The World Bank classiﬁes countries into low, middle and high income countries. Countries with a GNI
per capita between $4036 and $12475 fall into the category of upper middle income countries.
2
Table 1: Poverty and inequality in Peru since 2004
Year Population Poverty incidence Gini index
(in mio.) national urban rural
2004 27.4 58.7 48.2 83.4 0.49
2009 29.5 33.5 21.3 66.7 0.46
2014 31.1 22.7 15.3 46.0 0.42
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank).
of Economic Performance and Social Progress (also referred to as the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
Commission) (Stiglitz et al., 2009) explicitly included among its recommendations to re-
ﬂect in-kind beneﬁts in household income and consumption measures. This is particularly
relevant in the context of developing countries since unequal access to or availability of pub-
lic services contributes to persistence of poverty among societal groups and regions. An
unequal access to health and education services in particular has shown to aﬀect poverty
within and across generations (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2011). This paper tracks the impact of
social protection policies in the framework of an extended income approach that embraces
direct cash transfers and in-kind public social services including education on the expen-
diture side. Accounting for the value of publicly provided in-kind beneﬁts in an extended
income concept aims to reﬂect the contribution these make to the welfare of households and
individuals. We also take account of taxation that aﬀects private households and provides
the revenue base to ﬁnance public expenditure.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section will describe our methodology and the
data sources used. The third section introduces the social security system of Peru before
the fourth section presents the results from the analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on
inequality and poverty. The last section discusses the results and concludes.
2 Methods and Data
The aim of this paper is to quantify the impact that the Peruvian welfare state has on
poverty and inequality and to assess how eﬀective diﬀerent interventions are in alleviating
povery and leveling living standards. We adopt the approach put forward by Lustig et
al (2013) and track the resources available to households along diﬀerent income concepts.
Graph 1 illustrates our approach.
2.1 Related Literature
In a comparative study for OECD member countries, Verbist et al. (2012) show that the
inclusion of ﬁve categories of social public services not only raises households' economic
resources by more than 25% on average, with large variation among countries. It also
accounts for a reduction of income inequality by between one third and one ﬁfth depend-
ing on the inequality index used. These redistributive impacts are stronger among poorer
population groups. Spending on in-kind services is on average slightly higher in the OECD
than on cash transfers, which underlines the importance of including them in the analysis.
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Figure 1: Methodology: Constructing extended income
Source: Adapted from Lustig and Higgins (2013)
The Commitment to Equity (CEQ) project at Tulane University has devised an ex-
tensive methodological guide that outlines the steps of such analysis (Lustig and Higgins,
2013). In a comparative study of six Latin American economies, Lustig et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that direct taxes and targeted cash transfers reduce inequality and poverty signiﬁcantly
in three out of the six countries compared (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) while to a far
lesser extent in the three remaining countries of the analysis (Bolivia, Mexico and Peru).
The small impact in the latter group is mainly due to low overall spending. In all coun-
tries under analysis, the redistributive impact of in-kind beneﬁts is relatively large since
the provision of public services in health and education comprise a sizable share of overall
social spending.
Jaramillo (2013) has undertaken an incidence analysis for Peru based on the same
methodology. In his cross-sectional analysis for the ﬁscal year of 2009, he ﬁnds that the
redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system in Peru is small: it is associated with
a four percentage point decrease in the Gini index (from 0.504 to 0.463) and a reduction
in poverty of approximately 1.2 percentage points. This small impact is attributed to the
relatively low spending rather than to ineﬀective targeting. Quite the opposite: social
spending overall is progressive, with targeted cash transfers being the most progressive
category since they are not linked to formal sector employment (which often excludes the
poorest segments of society). Taxes, while being progressive overall, are found to have
hardly any impact on inequality.
Their study is based on the ﬁscal year of 2009, which saw growth ﬁgures plummeting com-
pared to the previous and the following years as a consequence of the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Furthermore, overall and social public spending have increased considerably between 2009
and 2014. The creation of the Ministry for Development and Social Inclusion (MIDIS) in
2011 was accompanied by the introduction of new social assistance measures such as a so-
cial pension while others expanded regionally. The aim of this paper is hence to revisit the
eﬀects of social protection upon poverty and inequality. Given the high regional diversity
in welfare and access to economic opportunities in Peru, the analysis will depart from a
national level to analyze whether social policy contributes to equalizing living standards
across regions. We built the analysis upon the methodology provided by CEQ (Lustig and
Higgins, 2013) in large parts but depart from it in the valuation of public services and
draw upon Verbist et al. (2012) and Aaberge et al. (2017).
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2.2 Constructing income concepts
As ﬁgure 1 illustrates, the analysis traces gross household income before ﬁscal interven-
tion to extended income, taking into account direct and indirect taxes, social security
contributions (SSC), cash transfers and public services. Gross income takes into account
income earned through labour or self-employment, capital income and rents, imputed in-
come from owner-occupied housing, bonus and in-kind payments from employers, transfers
from abroad and imputed values of self-consumed self-production such as subsistence farm-
ing. We move to net market income by deducting personal income taxes (PIT) as well as
health and pension contributions. The latter are not treated as deferred income but in-
stead as a government transfer given the large subsidy the scheme receives from the general
budget (we conduct a sensititvity analysis where pensions are treated as market income).
We add direct government transfers to arrive at disposable income. Under direct trans-
fers we group income received from cash transfers as well as imputed values of food items
received. Food items have a well-deﬁned market value and substitute private spending
(Lustig and Higgins, 2013), hence they are included under direct rather than in-kind
transfers. The largest cash transfers are the means-tested conditional cash transfer (CCT)
Juntos and the social pension Pensión 65. Also included are receipts from contributory
pensions, income-tested scholarships that aim to broaden access to higher education for
youngsters from poor families, vouchers distributed to poor families for buying cooking gas
and other public cash transfers reported in the household survey.
Inequality and poverty within a society are usually measured on the basis of disposable
income. We move further to subtract indirect taxes paid by households in the form of
value-added tax (VAT) and excise taxes2 and thus arrive at post-ﬁscal income. Finally, we
add the value of public services that households receive in early childhood care, education
and health.
The analysis incorporates only spending directed at individuals and whose beneﬁciaries
can be identiﬁed (both in principle in the sense that an individual use is possible, and in
practice in the sense that the survey includes information on actual use). This means that
collective spending such as research and development or social infrastructure investment is
left out of the analysis. Also left out are measures that are directed at individual beneﬁcia-
ries but where these cannot be identiﬁed in the survey. Section 3 below describes in more
detail the types of transfers included in the analysis. Tabel 8 in the appendix compares
information on transfer receipt and tax payments in the ENAHO with oﬃcial ﬁgures from
national accounts and MIDIS beneﬁciary registers.
We aggregate income at the household level and assume that resources are pooled and
shared among its members. To make comparisons across heterogenous households and ad-
just for diﬀerences in their needs, the use of equivalence scales is universally acknowledged.
Equivalence scales assign diﬀerent weights to household members to account for economies
of scale within the household that arise since resources are shared. This is particularly
important when measuring the incidence of poverty as families with children, especially
larger ones, may appear non-poor when looking at equivalized income but fall below the
poverty threshold when looking at per capita household income. The application of the
same equivalence scales for cash and in-kind beneﬁts is, however, debated. Public services
such as education cannot be shared among household members and certain population
2For simplicity, we group excise and value-added taxes together and refer to them as VAT for the
remainder of the analysis
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groups have a greater need for services. Children are a case in point: while they are as-
signed a comparably low weight in OECD scales based on the argument that they consume
fewer basic goods, they have higher needs for education than adults.
Aaberge et al. (2010) propose a needs-adjusted equivalence scale, which is a weighted
average between the modiﬁed OECD scale and an empirically derived scale that accounts
for individual needs of public services. For the case of Norway, they derive the latter by
looking at diﬀerences in group-speciﬁc spending on public services at the municipal level.
Such approach has the advantage that it can ﬂexibly adjust for diﬀerent target groups
and services, and that it does not depend on absolute spending levels but rather relative
ones measured against a speciﬁed reference group. However, it it is arguably based on
the assumption that current public spending is optimal in the sense that it satisﬁes the
needs of the population. For a middle income country such as Peru, which displays large
regional heterogeneity in welfare and in administrative capacity to deliver public services,
this seems not a practical solution.
We hence adopt a more pragmatic solution and apply a combined scale put forward by
Aaberge et al. (2017). The modiﬁed OECD scale is applied to monetary incomes while a
per capita scale is applied to in-kind beneﬁts based on the argument that no economies of
scale arise from the latter. The two are combined into a single scale3, which is subsequently
applied along all income concepts. The analysis is based on a cross-sectional rather than
a lifetime perspective. Hence, when interpreting the results, one must bear in mind the
demographic structure of Peru, which is characterized by a fairly young population.4
2.3 Valuating public services
Valuating public services is a challenging task that cannot do without relying on various as-
sumptions. The ﬁrst question that arises is how to express the value of services in monetary
terms, given that we only observe public expenditure and that these services are commonly
not traded on the market. We follow Verbist et al. (2012) and rely on a production cost
approach that is based on two premises: (i) production costs are a proper reﬂection of the
value that services provide to users; and (ii) services are delivered eﬃciently and no waste
is incorporated into production costs. While these may be strong assumptions, the alterna-
tive  estimating the actual value that users attribute to services  arguably relies on even
stronger assumptions and high data demands. In the case of pre-primary childcare services
and education, production costs derive from average spending per student per department
by educational level (ﬁgure 6 in the appendix) net of registration and matriculation fees.
These costs are allocated to households that report making use of public childcare and ed-
ucation services. To relax the assumption that expenditures provide an accurate reﬂection
of service value and given that household surveys often underestimate incomes, we follow
Lustig and Higgins (2013) and scale their value so that the ratio between in-kind education
services and mean disposable income in our sample equals that of total education spending
3To aggregate the two scales into one, their individual contribution is weighted by the ratio between
needs for disposable and extended income. This weight is derived from the mean ratio between cash and
non-cash income income in extended income.
4Approximately 46% of the population are below the age of 25 while only 6.6% are aged 65 or above
(INEI, 2015b).
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and national disposable income in national accounts.5
The valuation and allocation of health services is more complex. While we also rely
on production costs to assess service value, a crucial question is what exactly we want to
deﬁne as the service consumed - the actual medical services consumed by individuals who
happen to need them, or the risk sharing that insurance provides? Valuating the actual use
ignores diﬀerences in needs and attributes a higher welfare to an ill person under medical
treatment than to a healthy person with equal disposable income. By valuating the bene-
ﬁts from insurance instead, we allocate the premium of publicly provided health insurance
to households covered. It thus acknowledges the fact that individuals receive a beneﬁt
from the risk-pooling of insurance regardless of their actual service use. The drawback is
that such approach cannot take account of diﬀerences in quality and coverage of health
services. In Peru, a signiﬁcant share of individuals covered by insurance report not using
public health despite illness due to factors such as the large distance to the nearest facility,
a lack of money or trust in doctors.
We opt for the insurance value approach for two reasons. From a pragmatic viewpoint,
the information contained in the survey about the use of medical services is incomplete in
the sense that only low-frequency services such as surgery and child delivery are surveyed
with a 12-month recall period while higher frequency needs such as general check-ups have
a recall period of 3 months or only 4 weeks. Information about health insurance aﬃliation,
on the other hand, is complete. From a conceptual angle, the assumption that needs for
health insurance are comparable across the population (conditional on certain risk factors)
is arguably less strong than assuming that someone who needs intensive medical care is
better oﬀ than someone who does not see a doctor in a given year. Estimating an insurance
value is complicated by the fact that private health insurance is scarce in Peru and only
available for services not covered by public insurance. Public insurance oﬀer voluntary
aﬃliation for non-target populations, but their pricing does not vary by risk group and
thus hardly provides an actuarial reﬂection of costs. We thus rely on detailed costing
studies from both health insurance funds in combination with health use statistics from
administrative records of the insurance funds to calculate insurance premiums that vary
by insurance fund, age, gender and department. Details on the method of calculation are
provided in appendix C. We provide a sensitivity analysis that values services according to
actual use. We construct actual use values by imputing annual use based on information
about quarterly and monthly service use by individuals. Analogue to cash income sources,
we assume that the value of services consumed by the household equals the weighted sum
of services consumed by its members.
2.4 Data sources
The main data source is the 2014 version of the Peruvian National Household Survey,
shortly referred to as ENAHO (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares). It is an annual household
survey of approximately 31.700 households covering all regions of the country that holds a
rich set of information on demographics, income sources of all household members aged 14
and above, consumption and expenditure as well as use of health and education services
for all household members. Additionally, data on consolidated government expenditure
is drawn from the National Accounts as well as from the Integrated Financial Manage-
5The scaling factor is 0.92 and thus has no large eﬀect.
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ment System (SIAF) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Education's
Statistics Unit (ESCALE) and the two public health insurance funds Seguro Integral de
Salud (SIS) and EsSalud. The MIDIS makes available detailed information on the number
of beneﬁciaries of targeted cash transfer programmes that is used for consistency checks
on information about transfer receipt in the ENAHO.
3 The welfare state in Peru
Social government expenditures have risen in Peru over the past two decades, but they
are still below the Latin American average and that of upper middle income countries.6
Table 2 gives an overview of the government budget in 2014. The state collected revenues
amounting to 22.2% of GDP while total spending reached 21.5% of GDP. With 17% of
GDP, the great bulk of revenues were drawn from taxes, and these again were mainly
collected through value-added tax (8.8% of GDP) and income tax (7% of GDP, of which
1.9% of GDP were collected from natural persons). Non-tax revenues of 5.2% of GDP
include social security contributions (2.2% of GDP), oil and mining royalties among oth-
ers (Central Bank Peru, 2014). On the expenditure side, 10% of GDP or 44.8% of total
spending are dedicated to social sectors. These comprise the sectors of education (3.4%
of GDP), health (2.3% of GDP), social assistance (1% of GDP), and social security (2.3%
of GDP). The classiﬁcation of social spending this study adopts is according to Martínez
and Paz Collinao (2010).7
Table 3 gives some descriptive indicators of our sample by income quintiles. It shows
that the top quintile earns more than 13 times as much as the bottom quintile and that
inequality is higher at the upper end of the distribution. The amount of public transfers
(including income from contributory pensions) does not vary greatly between the bottom
four income quintiles, while it is considerably higher in the top quintile. The poorest are
concentrated in rural areas, are much less educated and more likely to belong to an indige-
nous group. The bottom quintile is more likely to be aﬃliated to public health insurance.
The following sections will outline the basic architecture of the Peruvian welfare state poli-
cies in more detail.
3.1 Revenues: Personal income tax, contributions and VAT
As typicial for low and middle income countries, Peru has a very low PIT collection rate:
PIT revenues only amount to 1.9% of GDP. This is due both to weak collection capacities
and by design. The Tax Code exempts income from work of up to PEN 26 600 from PIT,
this threshold exceeds even mean earnings. Capital income and dividends are subject to
much lower rates of 6.25% and 4.1% respectively. Furthermore, there is a high degree of
informality in the Peruvian economy: ILO estimates suggest that 69% of non-agricultural
employment is in the informal sector (ILO, 2014). This high degree of informality also af-
6In 2014, Peru's social expenditure was 10% of GDP and 49% of public expenditure compared to the
average for Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) of 13.5% of GDP and 51% (CEPAL).
7The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) provide a methodology
for the classiﬁcation of social spending in Latin America that includes: education, health and sanitation,
social assistance and social protection, social housing and related infrastructure development.
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Table 2: Government ﬁnances in 2014
PEN US
GDP (Mio.) 574 880 189 710
GDP per capita 18 656 6 157
Population 30.9 Mio
As % of GDP
Total Revenue 22.2
1. Tax revenues 17.0
2. Non-tax revenues 5.2
Total Government Spending 22.6
1. Primary spending 21.5
2. Debt service 1.1
As % of Pub. Spend. GDP
Social Spending 44.8 10
1. Education 15.5 3.5
2. Health 10.3 2.3
3. Social Assistance 4.5 1
4. Social Security 10.3 2.3
5. Other 4.2 0.9
Source: National Statistics Institute (INEI), Ministry of
Economy and Finance, National Bank of Peru.
fects social insurance: Peru has contributory health and pension schemes that are manda-
tory for dependent workers only. The public pension scheme can optionally be substituted
by a private one that is subject to the same contribution of 13% of gross salary as the
public National Pension System (SNP by its Spanish acronym). The contributory health
insurance EsSalud described further below is ﬁnanced by a premium of 9% of gross salary
which is borne by the employer. VAT is levied at a rate of 19% but collection falls 33%
below its potential according to IMF estimates. Overall, the IMF estimates that tax eﬀorts
in Peru reach only 53% of potential revenue (Lipinsky et al., 2015).
The ENAHO records the amount of taxes paid on income from dependent work, but
not on income from independent work or capital. We thus simulate PIT tax liability
according to the Tax Code. We further assume that the incidence of contributions to
EsSalud fall on the employer given the large informal labour force that formal workers have
to compete with. We thus include both contributions to pension and health insurance in
gross market income. To estimate the amount of VAT paid by each household, we rely on
the rich information about consumption expenditure that records not only items bought,
but also their place of purchase.We thus calculate the share of VAT in total consumption
expenditure, applying diﬀerential rates according to the Tax Code and assuming that small,
informal establishments do not levy VAT.8 Analogue to the procedure described in section
8The Tax Code exempts basic food items, children's books and notebooks, public transport (except
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics by income quintiles, 2014
Income quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Total N
Annual net income 2 208 5 502 8 894 13 430 29 420 11 890 116075
Income from cash transfers 550 473 506 542 808 576 116075
Share urban 39% 75% 89% 94% 97% 79% 116075
Household members 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.8 116075
Age in years 33.2 30.9 31.7 32.7 35.9 32.9 116075
Years of education 4.2 6.1 7.6 8.9 10.8 7.5 110914
Indigenous mother tongue 42% 31% 24% 19% 15% 26% 116059
Has health insurance 79% 66% 61% 60% 63% 76% 116014
In education 29% 29% 27% 26% 24% 27% 116010
Notes: Income refers to annual adult equivalent income (OECD modiﬁed scale) in PEN (PPP conversion rate
of 1.515, source: OECD Stat). Cash transfers include targeted social assistance, public pensions, food aid,
vouchers for cooking gas. Indigenous mother tongue includes Aymara, Quechua, other native language. Health
insurance refers to the non-contributory Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS) and the contributory EsSalud.
Source: Own calculations based on ENAHO 2014.
2.3, we scale the value of VAT paid by a factor that sets the ratio between the share of
VAT paid and disposable household income equal to that in national accounts.
3.2 Social assistance
Peru's National Strategy for Development and Social Inclusion: Include to Grow (MIDIS,
2014) under the Ministry for Social Development summons the range of social assistance
programmes along the life-cycle of the poor. These comprise of direct cash-transfer pro-
grammes for diﬀerent target groups, food assistance and other in-kind provision of goods
and services as well as infrastructure investment such as electriﬁcation and sanitation pro-
grammes. Often, these social programmes are available in certain regions of the country
only, either because these were identiﬁed as most in need, up-scaling is planned over a pe-
riod of several years, or because they run under the responsibility of regional governments.
The largest direct cash transfers targeted to poor households include the conditional
cash transfer (CCT) Juntos, the old-age pension scheme Pensión 65, and the post-secondary
scholarship fund Beca 18. Juntos pays a bi-monthly support of 200 PEN to needy fami-
lies with children if these children attend school regularly and complete mandatory health
checks, while Pensión 65 oﬀers 125 PEN monthly to elderly aged 65 plus that are classi-
ﬁed as poor and not covered by the contributory system. Beca 18 oﬀers higher education
scholarships to secondary school graduates from poor families based on merit that cover
tuition fees, living costs and book allowances. Food assistance programmes had previously
been rather fragmented but eﬀorts to bundle them were implemented more recently. The
largest one is the school feeding programme Qali Warma, while smaller ones include food
banks and nutritional aid directed at certain risk groups.9 In total, spending on social
railway and airway), and cultural events from VAT, and applies higher rates to alcohol and tobacco. We
regard mobile vendors (operating by trycycle or van) as informal. Additionally, we regard bakeries and
small market stalls operating in the jungle and above 2500 meter altitude as informal since the Tax Code
exempts establishments that are located above 2500 meter from paying taxes.
9Qali Warma distributes breakfast and lunch to school children in districts reaching a certain poverty
and malnutrition threshold. Food banks are bundled under the Complementary Nutrition Programme
10
assistance represents 4.5 percent of total government spending or 1% of GDP. While the
Development Strategy also incorporates a range of measures to promote economic oppor-
tunities for the poor, these are not included here since the economic rather than the social
objectives deﬁne their design10.
3.3 Health
Approximately 78% of Peru's population is covered by health insurance, whereby two pub-
lic schemes exist. The contributory scheme EsSalud operates own health facilities, which
are mostly located in urban centers. EsSalud covers around a quarter of the population.
The Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS) is a subsidized, means-tested health insurance targeted
at the poor and covers around 49% of the population. Only a very small fraction of these
pay a reduced premium (less than 2%) while the vast majority is fully subsidized. Families
covered by the SIS receive health services free at the point of use in public facilities located
throughout the country under a comprehensive beneﬁt plan called PEAS11. PEAS is also
the minimum standard that EsSalud has to guarantee. Non-insured can receive treatment
in public facilities but are charged fees that cover the variable costs of their treatment.
Out-of-pocket expenditures are high in Peru (government expenditures make up approx-
imately 60% of total health expenditure, see Francke (2013)). This results partly from
incomplete coverage of health insurance but also from co-payments for services that are
either not covered by PEAS or experience rationing due to chronic underfunding of the SIS.
Even though hardly used in practice, both SIS and EsSalud oﬀer the option of voluntary,
fee-based aﬃliation for the non-poor and informal workers. Francke (2013) attributes the
reason for this low take-up of voluntary insurance to the fact that many Peruvians are still
relatively unfamiliar with insurance products.
In expenditure terms, the health budget is divided into individual and collective health
spending. Collective health receives 8% of total health spending and includes programmes
such as epidemiology and risk control, while individual health consumes over 73% and
includes all those measures that are directed at health service provision and medical treat-
ment. This analysis does not include collective spending but focuses on spending that can
be attributed to individual use.
3.4 Education
The education system in Peru is divided into basic, technical and higher education. Basic
education is mandatory and free in public facilities and comprises early childhood care (up
to 3 years), primary (6 years) and secondary (5 years) education. Compliance is, however,
not enforced and large diﬀerences in secondary school enrolment rates exist between urban
and rural areas and between poor and non-poor households, partly due to low coverage
in remote rural areas. Pre-school facilities are also insuﬃcient in parts of the country.
(Programa de Complementación Alimentaria), and Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) targets nutritional aid
at risk groups such as children under 5, pregnant women and the poor elderly.
10These are in particular the fund FONCODES, which aims to improve market access for impoverished
rural farmers and home-producers, and the public works programmes Work Peru (Trabaja Perú) and Youth
to Work (Jovenes a la Obra).
11PEAS is the Spanish acronym for Essential Health Insurance Plan (Plan Esencial de Aseguramiento
en Salud)
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With almost 70%, the bulk of spending in education goes towards the basic level. Tertiary
education spending amounts to 18% and mainly goes towards university education, while
only a small share is dedicated to technical education or other forms of post-secondary
training. Private education plays a large role primarily in urban areas and ENAHO holds
information about type of school visited and school fees paid.
3.5 Other social expenditure
Further social spending categories include housing and sanitation, which together make up
less than 1% of GDP. These comprise measures to improve infrastructure in informal set-
tlements and install or upgrade sanitation infrastructure in rural and urban areas. Since we
cannot identify whether individual households beneﬁtted from such services, this spending
is not included in the analysis.
4 Results
We start out by examining how ﬁscal policy aﬀects households along the income distri-
bution. Graph 2 plots the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers by income decile,
whereby we measure impact as the change in income relative to each decile's initial gross
market income (i.e. a non-anonymous approach where individuals are followed according to
their initial rank in the distribution (Verbist et al., 2012)). A ﬁrst look conveys a strongly
progressive tax and transfer system: the bottom ﬁve deciles are net recipients of public
social spending while the upper deciles are net payers. Particularly the two lower deciles
experience a strong rise in living standards: extended income is almost twice as high as
initial gross market income for the poorest decile and increases by approximately a third
for the second decile. On the other end, transfers represent less than 5% of gross income
in the upper two deciles while their share of taxes reaches 8-11%. The average impact for
the whole population is slightly negative. The highest redistributive impact is achieved
by in-kind transfers: education beneﬁts represent about half the average gross income
of the lowest decile, whereas health beneﬁts are less substantive. This can be explained
by higher overall public spending on education compared to health, the fact that poorer
deciles use public education much more than higher deciles, and that they also have more
children that make use of education facilities but have a relatively low health risk factor.
Cash transfers represent a large share of 16-38% of initial gross income in the lower two
deciles while they hardly play a role at the upper end of the distribution. PIT is negli-
gible up to the ﬁfth decile but even in the richest decile, it only taxes away around 11%
of gross income. Unsurprisingly, VAT burdens lower income deciles more although they
spend a large share of their overall budget on basic food items, which are exempt from VAT.
Obviously, these are relative impacts that are measured against each decile's average
income. The same amount of transfer thus means a lot more for a poor individual than a
rich one. Given the high levels of income inequality, the picture looks diﬀerent when we look
at redistribution in absolute amounts. Graph 3 compares mean incomes by decile along
our sequence of income concepts. Although income of the bottom decile almost doubles,
the distance between deciles remains relatively stable. The top two deciles experience a
net reduction in extended income compared to gross but the change in levels seems not
very substantive. The graph further shows that the distance between deciles increases at
higher deciles, suggesting that inequality is larger in the upper half of the distribution.
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The dotted red line represents the relative povery threshold measured as 50% of median
disposable income. It follows the third decile closely and only falls slightly below it in
disposable income. This illustrates that the incidence of relative poverty remains largely
unaﬀected by redistribution through direct taxation and transfers, but falls when we look
at an extended income concept.
4.1 Redistribution along income concepts
To quantify the reduction in inequality, we compare three diﬀerent inequality measures:
the Gini index, the P90/10 decile ratio and the P40 share. While the Gini index has many
advantages apart from its ease of interpretation12, it is also sensitive to changes in the
middle of the distribution (Atkinson, 1970). We thus further report the decile ratio and
P40 share as two easily interpretable measures that focus on the ends of the distribution.
Table 4 reports the results. Overall, the Gini index sees a reduction of almost 7 percentage
points from 0.473 in gross income to 0.406 in extended income. According to Atkinson
(2015), we can set a benchmark of at least 3 percentage points change in the Gini coeﬃ-
cient in order for it to be substantive enough to be felt by society. By this measure, the
decrease in inequality observed here is substantive. However, when we look at the contri-
bution of the diﬀerent ﬁscal measures, we notice that the reduction in inequality is driven
by in-kind beneﬁts: they contribute almost two thirds to the overall reduction. Direct
transfers contribute only approximately 1 percentage point while direct taxes and social
security contributions contribute almost two. This is indicative not only of the small trans-
fer amounts that social assistance programmes pay, but also of the relatively high value of
12These are in particular its mean and scale independence, population size independence, and Pigou-
Dalton transfer sensitivity
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public education and health when compared to the incomes of the poor. While this under-
lines again how important it is to include services in the analysis, it also raises questions
on the role of service quality, a discussion we will return to further below. Contrary to
what has been found for other countries in the region, notably Brazil (Lustig and Higgins,
2013), subtracting VAT has no adverse impact on inequality. This is likely a consequence
of the high level of informality and lack of enforcement as described above. Table 11 in
the appendix reports bootstrapped standard errors of the estimated Gini coeﬃcients: they
conﬁrm that changes in the Gini are small and only statistically signiﬁcant when we move
from gross to net income, and when we move to extended income.
The two other inequality measures conﬁrm the trend indicated by the Gini index: The
P90/10 ratio measures the ratio between the income of the 90th percentile and the 10th
percentile while the P40 share states the share in total income that is held by the bottom
40%. Departing from gross income, a household in the 90th percentile earns almost 12
times as much as a household in the 10th percentile. This ratio decreases to below 10
in disposable income, but only sees a more substantive change when looking at extended
income, where the ratio is at 6.7. Similarly, the income share held by the bottom 4 deciles
accounts for 12% in gross incomes, almost 14% in disposable income and 16% in extended
income. Comparing the changes in the P90/10 ratio with the changes in the P40 share
suggests that a substantive share of redistribution takes place in the upper half of the
distribution.
The upper panel of table 4 measures average changes at the national level. As illus-
trated above, large inequalities persist between urban and rural areas in Peru 13. Looking
at these areas separately shows that overall inequality is much higher in rural areas than in
urban areas. At the same time, the reduction in inequality achieved is also higher in rural
areas: here, the Gini index sees a decrease of more than 10 percentage points. In contrast,
13The classiﬁcation of urban and rural adopted here is according to ENAHO: an area with more than
2000 inhabitants counts as urban.
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Table 4: Changes in inequality along income concepts
Indicator Gross Net Disposable Post-ﬁscal Extended
Gini 0.473 0.454 0.446 0.447 0.406
P90/10 11.39 10.54 9.39 9.46 6.67
P40 share 12.2% 13.0% 13.5% 13.4% 15.9%
Urban only (N: 77 819)
Gini 0.430 0.410 0.404 0.406 0.374
P90/10 7.13 6.54 6.29 6.43 5.19
P40 share 15.0% 15.9% 16.2% 16.1% 17.9%
Rural only (N: 38 256)
Gini 0.469 0.459 0.429 0.434 0.355
P90/10 9.60 9.42 7.37 7.62 4.98
P40 share 12.7% 13.0% 14.8% 14.5% 18.7%
Note: Figures refer to adult equivalent income of 2014 (combined scale).
the reduction experienced in urban areas ﬁgures at only 5.5 percentage points. Again, the
largest share can be attributed to in-kind beneﬁts: in rural areas, they account for 8 and
in urban areas for 3 percentage points. Cash transfers on the other hand have hardly any
impact in urban areas while they represent a 3 points reduction in rural areas. By design,
a number of social assistance programmes (most notably the CCT Juntos) are primarily
targeted at rural areas. Direct taxes and social security contributions hardly play a role
in rural areas and even in urban areas, they contribute only 2 points and are statistically
not signiﬁcant. In urban areas, only the reduction through in-kind services is statistically
signiﬁcant, in rural areas the reduction through cash transfers is also signiﬁcant (see Table
11).
The P90/10 ratio and the P40 share conﬁrm both the lower level of inequality in urban
areas and the smaller change achieved by ﬁscal intervention. In urban areas, the only
substantive change is achieved by in-kind beneﬁts. In rural areas, cash transfers also play
a signiﬁcant role although in-kind beneﬁts are far more signiﬁcant. Tables 9 and 10 in the
appendix report a range of sensitivity analyses to test the assumptions we made in the
deﬁnition of the income concepts. In particular, we test whether our results are robust to
using a per capita scale rather than equivalized income (table 9), shifting the incidence
for EsSalud contributions entirely onto the employer, treating contributory pensions as de-
ferred income rather than a transfer, and adopting an actual use valuation for public health
services (table 10). Results hardly change: using a per capita scale unsurprisingly leads
to a higher estimated Gini and a slightly lower redistributive impact of transfers (about
1.5 percentage points in gross and 2 points in disposable and extended income compared
to the benchmark analysis) , but trends are largely similar. The same can be said for the
other robustness checks, shifting health contributions entirely on the employer aﬀects the
Gini in gross income by less than half a percentage point and valuating health services
by actual use has a slightly stronger redistributive impact but these diﬀerences are not
statistically signiﬁcant (compare table 11).
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4.2 Inequality between regions
The above analysis has shown that when splitting the sample into rural and urban house-
holds, changes in the Gini within these subgroups cease to be signiﬁcant along most of
the stages of ﬁscal intervention with the only consistent exception being the impact of
public services. This suggests that diﬀerences between regions must be signiﬁcant. A main
advantage of the Gini index is its ease of interpretation. However, it cannot easily be
decomposed. The Theil index, which belongs to the family of general entropy measures,
can in turn be decomposed into changes between and within groups. While we only dis-
tinguished between urban and rural areas above, Peru's landscapes divide society in many
ways: the coast as the most prosperous region is more densely populated, has better in-
frastructure and higher average income. The highlands and jungle regions in turn are less
accessible, have a higher share of indigenous population as well as higher rates of poverty
and informalization.
Table 5 thus decomposes overall inequality into inequality within and between four ge-
ographic regions for gross income and extended income respectively. Comparing income
and population shares across regions illustrates the large diﬀerences: the highlands are
the poorest region, followed closely by the jungle while incomes are more than twice as
high in the metropolitan region of Lima. Lima is not only the richest region but also
has the lowest inequality. Relative income shares of each region hardly change between
gross and extended income, although the Theil index of within-group inequality decreases
in all regions. The lower panel of table 5 thus compares the contribution of within and
between group inequality along all income concepts. As discussed above, overall inequality
decreases along income concepts but the share of between group inequality hardly changes
until we move to extended income. We compute the ratio of within to between group
inequality: it remains rather stable throughout and moves between 5.6 and 6.1. In other
words, inequality within the respective regions contributes over 80% to overall inequality
while inequality between the regions contributes less than 20%. Graph 7 (appendix) plots
the densities of log incomes by regions and illustrates that mean levels are much lower in
the highlands and the jungle, and that the dispersion there is much wider. Redistribution
decreases this dispersion slightly.
Summing up so far, the analysis suggests that the overall reduction in inequality of
almost 7 Gini points achieved by the tax and transfer system is substantive, but it is
largely driven by the contribution of public services. These make up a relatively large
share of income in the lower deciles. The contribution of taxes and cash transfers is much
smaller and not always statistically signiﬁcant. This is largely due to the low transfer
volumes: these may be suﬃcient to reduce mass in the bottom tail of the distribution
and thus decrease inequality, but not by very much. The tax and transfer system hardly
reduces the large inequality between regions - most of the reduction in inequality happens
within regions. The next section turns the focus on the bottom of the distribution to
examine whether the welfare state reduces poverty eﬀectively.
4.3 Poverty
Povrty can be measured in various ways: high income countries usually rely on relative
measures that set the threshold at 50% or 60% of median income whereas in low and
middle income countries, absolute poverty - or the ability to meet the most basic needs
- is still a concern. Peru adopts an absolute poverty line that is calculated based on the
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Table 5: Inequality of gross and extended income within regions
Region
Income Population Mean Group
share share income Theil
Gross market income
Coast 21.0% 23.2% 11 494 0.278
Highlands 22.4% 32.3% 8 815 0.476
Jungle 9.3% 13.0% 9 133 0.467
Lima 47.4% 31.5% 19 115 0.315
Extended income
Coast 21.1% 23.2% 11 707 0.209
Highlands 23.9% 32.3% 9 530 0.307
Jungle 9.6% 13.0% 9 575 0.331
Lima 45.4% 31.5% 18 537 0.243
Theil decomposition of income inequality by regions
All obs. Theil Theil between Theil within Ratio
Gross market 0.416 0.058 0.357 6.124
Net market 0.378 0.055 0.324 5.896
Disposable 0.363 0.055 0.308 5.604
Post-ﬁscal 0.367 0.055 0.311 5.645
Extended 0.304 0.044 0.259 5.840
Note: Figures refer to annual adult equivalent income, ENAHO 2014.
methodology of Ravallion (2016)(Ch.4), where two components are derived from expen-
diture data of a reference population. The ﬁrst is a nutritional component that speciﬁes
the costs of regional food baskets that satisfy a minimal energy intake (extreme poverty).
The second is a non-food component that is derived by multiplying the extreme poverty
line with the inverse of the Engel coeﬃcient (i.e. the share of food spending in overall
spending). Summing these two components gives the moderate poverty line.14 Assessing
our income concepts against these poverty lines bears two challenges: poverty lines already
take the diﬀerences in needs for caloric intake and non-food expenditure into account by
construction, equivalising income will thus underestimate poverty. Second, the poverty
lines do not account for public services that are provided free of charge and where hence
no expenditure is observed. To solve the ﬁrst one, we measure the incidence of absolute
poverty based on per capita income rather than adult equivalent income15. The second
14Peru calculates the two components based on consumption spending (including consumption from self-
production) of the reference population (the 20th to 40th percentile in 2010 when the methodology was
revised, and approximately the 10th to 30th percentile of the population in 2014). The minimum caloric
intake is based on recommendations of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural
Organization that are adapted to Peruvian population parameters. Consumption spending data determines
the costs of regional food baskets and the Engler coeﬃcient, which is the share of food expenditure in total
expenditure. Poverty lines are updated yearly by revising the costs of food baskets and adapting the
reference population to take into account the drop in poverty over past years. For a detailed description
of Peru's poverty threshold calculation method, see INEI (2015a).
15We have alternatively scaled absolute poverty lines up by the mean ratio of per capita weight and
equivalence weight in the same reference population as used for the calculation of poverty lines. Results
do not diﬀer from the more pragmatic approach of using per capita income.
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one is more demanding: we calculate an extended poverty line that is consistent with the
approach Peru uses for calculating its monetary poverty lines.16 That is, we observe con-
sumption of the reference population that includes the costs for public services in health
and education. We deﬁne the needs for education and health in accordance with Peruvian
legislation that stipulates mandatory schooling up to complete secondary education and
aims to guarantee access to basic health care for all. We thus derive a third component for
service costs that we add to the monetary poverty line in order to arrive at an extended
poverty line. We report results for these oﬃcial poverty lines and our extended threshold
below.
We calculate two poverty measures that belong to the group of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
poverty metrics: the headcount ratio, also known as FGT0, counts the fraction of the pop-
ulation below the poverty threshold while the poverty gap, or FGT1, indicates the depth
of poverty (Foster et al., 1984). We use these for estimating absolute poverty, and ad-
ditionally estimate the incidence of relative poverty measured as 50% of adult equivalent
median income. We adopt a ﬁxed (rather than a ﬂoating) relative poverty measure that
is pegged against the median of extended income. Graph 4 reports the results. The ﬁrst
point to notice is that our headcount ratio of absolute poverty is higher than oﬃcial es-
timates of the National Institute of Statistics (INEI): it exceeds moderate poverty by 4
percentage points and extreme poverty even by 6 points. This is explained by the fact that
INEI uses consumption as a measure of welfare while we compute income poverty. In the
lowest decile of the income distribution, consumption is on average higher than income.
Among the consumption poor, between 18 and 20% of overall consumption is reported to
have been a private gift or donation, paid for in-kind, or not paid for and the household
does not remember who paid for it. Our income measure counts items that have been
self-produced or received as a public transfer, but not those from private donations.17 Our
relative income poverty measures come very close to consumption poverty. The measures
are diﬀerent in levels but follow the same trend: poverty is slightly lower in disposable
income than in market income (statistically not signiﬁcant when measured by a relative or
extended threshold) but only drops noticeably when extended income is considered. This
being said, using an extended poverty line leads to higher poverty estimates of 30% in ex-
tended income compared to the conventional approach of measuring moderate poverty in
disposable income, which yields 27%. Extreme poverty or the inability to meet basic needs
only experiences a slight reduction and is still at 10% in disposable income. The diﬀerence
between income and consumption poverty (the latter reaches 4.3% according to oﬃcial
estimates by the Peruvian government), which results from the high share of consumption
that comes from gifts and donations, suggests that private redistribution reaches the poor
more eﬀectively than public redistribution. Graph 8 (appendix) shows that trends do not
diﬀer much by regions although levels diﬀer markedly. In the highlands and the jungle,
almost 20% of the population experience extreme poverty in disposable income and around
39% experience moderate poverty. This compares to an incidence of 2% of extreme poverty
and 14% of moderate poverty in the metropolitan region of Lima as the richest region of
the country. Extreme poverty experiences the strongest decline in the highlands where it
is also highest to begin with.
16I would like to thank Francisco Ferreira from the World Bank Research Department for his recommen-
dation to use this approach.
17There are very few households that report zero income in gross and disposable aggregates. We drop
these from the analysis.
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The headcount ratio simply counts the number of people falling below a given threshold
but does not weigh in how poor these actually are or how unequal income is distributed
within the group of poor. The poverty gap estimates how large on average the gap is be-
tween current poverty levels and a poverty-free society, measured as the average per capita
shortfall in income of the population as a share of the poverty line. A high poverty gap
thus indicates that there is more mass at the very bottom of the distribution while a small
gap means that many of the poor are closely below the threshold and comparatively less
redistribution would lift them above it. Table 6 reports the poverty gap index for the three
absolute poverty measures, whereby extreme and moderate poverty are calculated on the
basis of disposable income and the last on the basis of extended income. The poverty gap
in extreme poverty is much smaller because fewer people are poor, it would hence cost less
to eradicate this form of poverty than others. To calculate these purely arithmetic costs of
eradicating poverty, we multiply the monetary value of the poverty line by the poverty gap
to arrive at the per capita cost in the population. To arrive at the mean per poor transfer
needed, we simply divide the former by the headcount ratio.
A gap of 3.8% on a monthly threshold of extreme poverty of PEN 161 (approximately
3.5 USPP per day and thus higher than the World Bank absolute poverty line for upper
middle income countries) means an average lumpsum payment of PEN 6.1 per person per
month to pay for closing the gap - each poor individual would need to receive on average
PEN 56.2 per month. The aggregate shortfall is less than 0.1% of GDP and hence much
less than Peru spends on social assistance. This obviously assumes perfect targeting, dis-
regards transaction costs and inequality among the poor. It is hence is not a reﬂection of
the actual costs that governments would accrue to achieve poverty eradication. The ﬁgure
merely serves to put the depth of poverty in relation to current income and transfer levels.
The gaps in moderate and extended poverty are higher by construction because the thresh-
olds are around twice as high as for extreme poverty and more people fall below it. The
per poor transfer to eradicate moderate poverty is on average PEN114, and slightly higher
at PEN119 to eliminate extended poverty (we disregard here that eliminating poverty in
an extended income approach is obviously not possible through mere cash transfers since
equivalents of public services are not always available in the private market). Although
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on aggregate the costs sum to less than 0.2% of GDP, the per poor transfer is actually
higher than what targeted assistance pays to the poor: the CCT Juntos pays on average
PEN100 per month family regardless of family size and is hence not primarily designed as
an income transfer to combat poverty. Pensión 65 pays a monthly PEN125 to the poor
elderly and can thus lift the average poor out of poverty. This illustrates that targeting is
a crucial factor for reducing poverty, but so is the level of transfers that reach the poor.
We will look at these questions in the following section.
Table 6: The poverty gap index for absolute poverty measures
FGT1
Std. Mean Per person Per poor Shortfall
error threshold transfer transfer % of GDP
Extreme 3.79% 0.0012 161 6.1 56.2 0.033%
Moderate 10.22% 0.0020 303 31.0 113.9 0.169%
Extended 9.60% 0.0018 370 35.6 118.5 0.193%
Population 31 271 Mio. GDP 574 880 (Mio PEN) N: 116075
Note: Absolute poverty thresholds are expressed as means because they vary regionally. Figures
refer to monthly income. The per poor transfer is calculated by multiplying the per person transfer
with the poverty headcount ratio.
4.4 Targeting of transfers
Targeting assistance to the poor bears two central challenges: identifying who is poor, and
overcoming barriers to actually reaching them through social assistance. We look at two
types of targeting errors in Graph 5: inclusion error deﬁned as the share of beneﬁciaries
that are non-poor, and exclusion error deﬁned as the share of poor that do not receive ben-
eﬁts. We proxy eligibility by falling below the moderate poverty threshold in net income
(i.e. pre-transfer) and meeting relevant eligibility criteria according to type of beneﬁt18.
Obviously these are not the targeting criteria used by the social assistance administration
and cannot be interpreted as a failure to reach the speciﬁed target population, but rather
as an error in targeting assistance to the income poor. Given that there is churning among
the poor, our income measure counts the transitory poor as well as the chronic poor.
We consider the four larger social assistance programmes and additionally an indicator for
whether a household receives any type of direct transfer from one of these four programmes
or smaller and more fragmented ones such as school feeding programmes. SNP refers to
transfers from contributory pension insurance and is hence not a transfer targeted to the
poor. We include it nonetheless because contributory pensions are partly tax-ﬁnanced.
Inclusion error ranges around 27 % for Juntos and Pensión 65 - more than a quarter of
beneﬁciaries do not fall below the moderate poverty threshold. This can be due to various
reasons: the targeting criteria of Peru's Household Targeting System (SISFOH) are multi-
dimensional and incorporate income and consumption levels but also housing conditions,
assets and the number of illiterate household members among others. Such multidimen-
sional proxy-means test is more likely to identify vulnerability to chronic poverty than a
18These are: having children below the age of 14 for Juntos, being aged 65 or above and not receiving a
contributory pension in the case of Pensión 65, and not being enrolled in EsSalud in the case of SIS.
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one-time income measure that we use. Further, there is no regular review of eligibility
status: once a household is classiﬁed as poor, this status is only reviewed upon request
by the household or upon decision by the municipal administration. Hence, a family can
graduate out of poverty but continue to receive transfers nonetheless. In the case of SIS,
certain risk groups such as pregnant women are eligible for enrolment regardless of poverty
status. The interpretation of the inclusion error measured here hence needs to take these
factors into account.
What seems more striking is the scale of exclusion error: Juntos and Pensión 65 fail to
reach almost 65% of the population whose incomes fall below the moderate poverty line
and meet the demographic eligibility criteria. There are various possible explanations be-
yond the fact that we target by a diﬀerent type of poverty than SISFOH: non-take up
may be a choice that weighs transaction costs against beneﬁts19, there are administrative
barriers such as the requirement to present birth certiﬁcates for all household members and
being registered, lack of information, or geographical targeting that precludes poor who
live in non-poor districts. The latter is noticeable when we look at the regional variation
in exclusion: the poor regions of the highlands have been prioritized for early stages of
rollout when Juntos and Pensión 65 were introduced while other regions of the coast and
the jungle are incorporated only gradually. Exclusion error for these targeted programmes
is hence lowest in the highlands, while it is highest for SNP since employment is largely
informal in the highlands and the jungle. A range of interventions, most notably Juntos
and school feeding programmes are not administered at all in Lima and other larger cities.
Contrary, in the poorest districts of the country individual targeting is not applied and
households can enroll without having a household SISFOH classiﬁcation. By and large it
seems clear, however, that if social protection aims to reduce risk and vulnerability, increas-
ing spending is necessary but not suﬃcient. It also needs to reach a larger share of the poor.
19In the case of Juntos, transaction costs are related to meeting conditionalities, but also other beneﬁts
may entail transaction costs such as the time investment into getting classiﬁed by SISFOH, travelling to
the nearest town with a bank to withdraw the transfer, obtaining necessary documentation among others.
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The poverty gap index suggests that reducing poverty substantially may be possible
with relatively small shares of GDP if transfers are targeted well. We hence calculate the
potential reduction in poverty and inequality that could be achieved through raising the
level and coverage of social assistance. The results presented in Table 7 are purely illus-
trative, they do not account for transaction or administrative costs nor any behavioural
changes. They further rely on the assumption that resources are shared within the house-
hold even though beneﬁts such as pensions may be individually targeted (an assumption
that is supported by empirical evidence (Duﬂo, 2000)). We consider four scenarios: (i)
tripling the transfer amount of Juntos and Pensión 65 for all existing beneﬁciary house-
holds, (ii) extending coverage of Juntos and Pensión 65 under the given rules to all moder-
ately poor that fulﬁl demographic eligibility criteria (thus completely eliminating exclusion
error), (iii) introducing a universal child allowance of PEN100 per month for every child
under the age of 15 in addition to existing beneﬁts if any, (iv) combining scenario 3 with
an additional targeted component of an adult equivalent (OECD modiﬁed scale) transfer
of 200 PEN per household member to households in moderate poverty.
The pure monetary costs range from 0.6 to 1.8% of GDP and would thus represent
a sizeable increase compared to current social assistance spending of 1% of GDP (which
includes administrative costs). However, simply relying on existing policies - with Juntos
and Pensión 65 being the largest targeted transfers that focus on families and the elderly -
will not make substantial achievements in addressing poverty and inequality even if beneﬁt
levels are tripled. Extending coverage to the excluded target group at the given low transfer
levels will achieve more poverty reduction at the same cost. Scenario 3, a universal transfer
that would cost about three times as much as the ﬁrst two proposals, has a lot higher
impact, especially on extreme poverty. Although the tight budget constraints of low and
middle income countries may be an argument against universal beneﬁts, they are often less
costly to administrate. Combining such intervention with a targeted supplement achieves
the highest poverty impact. This scenario pays on average higher amounts to the poor than
the poverty gap suggests would be needed to fully close the gap, nonetheless around 17%
remain poor (including 2.7% absolutely poor). This reﬂects the fact that the poverty gap
does not take inequality among the poor into account - the average-needed transfer may lift
some of the poor well above the poverty line and leave others just below it. The reduction
in Gini inequality is below two percentage points in all cases and reﬂects the high inequality
at both ends of the distribution that would necessitate much greater redistributive eﬀorts.
Table 7: Raising social protection spending
GDP Point reduction Post-transfer incidence
share Ex. Pov. Mod. Pov. Gini Ex. Pov. Mod. Pov. Gini
Scenario 1 0.58% 3.36 3.48 0.82 7.5% 23.8% 43.8
Scenario 2 0.56% 3.41 5.63 0.84 7.5% 21.6% 43.8
Scenario 3 1.66% 7.05 8.35 1.39 3.8% 18.9% 43.2
Scenario 4 1.84% 8.18 10.62 1.68 2.7% 16.6% 42.9
Notes: Ex. Pov. refers to the headcount ratio of extreme poverty and Mod. Pov. refers to the headcount
ratio of moderate poverty.
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4.5 Reforming the welfare state
A question that cannot be avoided when discussing a possible expansion of the welfare
state is why the current tax and direct transfer system is largely neutral in distributional
terms. Several political economy factors may help to explain the current status quo. First,
we cannot detach welfare spending from revenue generating capacities. The tax system
relies largely on indirect taxes and has a historically low PIT that contributes little to
redistribution and raises comparatively low revenues (less than 2% of GDP) that would
ﬁnance higher expenditure. The weak political representation of large parts of society cre-
ates little political pressure to raise PIT progression or broaden its base. Coupled with
this is an explicit aim to avoid ﬁscal illusion: strong central rules avoid debt ﬁnancing of
expenditure. Given the experience of the hyperinﬂation of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
there is a broad consensus among policymakers for pursuing macroeconomic stability.
Second, constraints in administrative capacities further challenge the eﬀective imple-
mentation of redistributive policies. While an administration reform that begun in the
mid-1990s strengthened those public agencies that are key for maintaining macroeconomic
stability, other public institutions, including those that administer social policies, still
lag behind. Limited administrative capacities and high staﬀ turnover thus challenge the
eﬀectiveness of public spending to address poverty and inequity (World Bank, 2012). Par-
ticularly at the regional and municipal level, authorities lack administrative capacities to
spend allocated budgets (Morón et al., 2009). The decentralization reform that started in
2001 established 25 regional governments but fell short of consolidating these into macro-
regions as planned. Smaller regions thus struggle to build eﬀective governments. Further,
some regions hold natural resources that are a source of tax revenues while others do not.
The canon system in Peru, which stipulates that regions where natural resources are ex-
tracted receive part of the proceeds, creates tensions between rich and poor regions in the
absence of a signiﬁcant ﬁscal equalization mechanism.
Third, the long history of authoritarian government and the weak political party sys-
tem that lacks any strong regionally based movements is responsible for a large detachment
of policymakers from vulnerable groups and a low overall trust in public institutions. The
ﬁrst free elections with universal suﬀrage were held only in 1980 in Peru, but political
power remains highly concentrated and unstable. Representative institutions such as the
Congress are weak  Congress has, in fact, no power to amend the Executive's annual
budget proposal and the citizen-to-member ratio is the highest among Andean countries
(Morón et al., 2009). Social sectors thus have few powerful advocates, even though more
than three quarters of the population regard the current levels of inequality as unjust or
very unjust (Latinobarómetro, 2013). These factors help to explain why Peru's tax and
transfer system has a relatively small redistributive impact even by regional comparison.
Political pressure for reform seems weak although the increasing problem of public safety,
which is a primary concern of the population and associated with high levels of inequality,
may strengthen preferences for more redistribution in the future (Herrera, 2017).
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5 Discussion
Weak social safety nets often coincide with low levels of income and high inequality while
the tax and transfer system of advanced welfare states such as the Scandinavian ones re-
duces inequality by 16 to 20 Gini points (OECD, 2017b). Building up a stronger system
of social protection that shields people from risk and vulnerability is a goal that the Pe-
ruvian government has adopted in the recent decade as evidenced by the creation of the
MIDIS. This paper has analyzed the impact of public social spending in Peru for the ﬁscal
year of 2014 upon inequality and poverty. By way of linking aggregate government ﬁnance
statistics to micro-level household data from the ENAHO, it has traced the eﬀect of ﬁscal
policy along diﬀerent concepts of household income. It has included in the analysis per-
sonal income taxes, social security contributions and consumption taxes on the revenue
side, and public cash transfers and social in-kind beneﬁts on the expenditure side. Given
that the values of publicly provided services are not readily observable, we have imputed
them based on expenditure data from administrative sources. Incorporating in-kind bene-
ﬁts into the analysis adds an important dimension since inequality is often assessed based
on disposable income while publicly provided services constitute a large share of social
spending, in particular in countries like Peru that dedicate a fairly small share of public
spending towards direct social assistance.
The results are mixed. The reduction in inequality that the tax and transfer system
achieves is small: it reduces the Gini coeﬃcient by around 7 percentage points. The
largest eﬀect, in fact more than half, is achieved through the provision of public services.
This is because the value of public services is high in relation to the incomes of the lower
decile and because the rich are more likely to opt for private services, especially in edu-
cation. Nonetheless, we must interpret the results with caution: they are obviously based
on assumptions about the valuation of public services, and about the relation between
production costs and the value services provide to citizens. While our results are robust to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations and account for regional variation in expenditure on public service
provision, this can only incompletely address questions regarding service quality. More
research is needed into estimating the quality frontiers and their implications for valuating
public services in middle income countries such as Peru.
The analysis has shown that high inequality in living standards between regions in the
country remains and is hardly tackled by public expenditure. Even though social assis-
tance is targeted to the poorest regions, this is insuﬃcient to meaningfully reduce the large
welfare gaps between the impoverished highlands and jungle regions vis-à-vis the relatively
wealthy coast. This also becomes evident when focusing on the lower end of the distri-
bution. While Peru has reached remarkable achievements in reducing poverty by more
than half in the past two decades, more than a quintile of the population continues to live
in poverty. The current social protection architecture is ill-suited to tackle this. Before
accounting for the value of public services, direct transfers contribute by less than 2 per-
centage points or less than 10% to poverty reduction. Public services have a much larger
impact upon the poor and reduce extended poverty by almost 9 percentage points or ap-
proximately a quarter, but obviously these will not address extreme poverty that describes
a situation where individuals cannot meet their most basic needs. Thus, unless transfers
to poor households are expanded signiﬁcantly in volume and coverage, social safety nets
will not tackle vulnerability. This would necessitate both a larger budget and a greater
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eﬀort of reaching the poor that are so far excluded.
There are several limitations to this study. First and foremost, it focuses only on a
one-dimensional monetary measure of welfare. It thus ignores other objectives of social
assistance that aim to achieve results in the medium to long term. Peru's ﬂagship CCT
Juntos in particular is an example of an intervention that pursues dual goals: poverty
reduction and human capital accumulation. It aims at building productive capacities
and reducing the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Further, it aims at inducing
behavioural changes in child-rearing that will help to improve child health. These impacts
are not factored into such analysis. On a more general level, the study does not model any
behavioral or equilibrium eﬀects and thus treats as a counterfactual merely gross market
income as observed before intervention. In the real world, however, it is hardly plausible
that economic agents do not react to tax and transfer policies and adjust their labour
supply or consumption decisions. Further, the coverage of ﬁscal policy is incomplete and
covers only social spending that can be directly attributed to individual use. It looks at
average eﬀects of the current system but does not provide clues about marginal changes
in government policies, such as what would happen to the income distribution if policy
were to change. Finally, the analysis takes the observed levels of inequality and poverty
as exogenously given and examines how tax and transfer policies may or may not change
them. It provides little explanations for the underlying factors that determine the starting
point from where the ﬁscal system takes oﬀ. These questions of political economy are,
however, crucial when it comes to reforming the welfare state. We have discussed three
main factors that help to explain the relatively weak redistributive capacities of the state,
without yet linking them to speciﬁc policies or the lack thereof. These points remain
subject for further research.
Despite these limitations, we can conclude that the system of social protection in Peru
is not close-knit but rather leaves a large share of the population insuﬃciently protected
from social risk and vulnerability. Peru has made great advances in reducing poverty and
inequality over the past two decades, but these were also the times of high commodity prices
and rising exports that induced a growth pattern that was shared across the distribution. In
less favourable macroeconomic conditions, sustained poverty reduction and redistribution
will likely necessitate a stronger welfare state.
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Appendix A Graphs
Figure 6: Annual education spending per student by level
Note:Spending refers to mean annual spending per student per level in PEN, 2014. Soruce: Ministry of Education.
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Table 8: Tax and beneﬁt receipts in ENAHO and administrative accounts
Social assistance
Unit Admin.data ENAHO Ratio
Juntos Households 755 556 739 899 97.9%
Pensión 65 Individuals 450 000 432 230 96.1%
Beca 18 Individuals 11 419 13 111 114.8%
Revenues
Unit Nat.accounts ENAHO Ratio
PIT Mio. PEN 10 894 8 260 75.8%
SSC Mio. PEN 12 513 9 017 72.1%
VAT Mio. PEN 28 732 14 035 48.8%
Note: PIT payments include capital and rent taxation and is simulated according
to the Tax Code. Social security contributions (SSC) include contributions for the
health fund EsSalud and the pension fund SNP. VAT (omly domestic included here)
is simulated from consumption spending and scaled by a factor of 2.02 (see section
3.1).
Table 9: Changes in inequality along income concepts (Annual per capita income)
Indicator Gross Net Disposable Post-ﬁscal Extended
Gini 0.489 0.470 0.464 0.465 0.425
P90/10 12.08 11.20 9.99 10.08 7.11
P40 share 11.7% 12.4% 12.8% 12.7% 15.1%
Urban only (N: 77 819)
Gini 0.446 0.427 0.423 0.424 0.393
P90/10 7.68 7.02 6.91 6.97 5.63
P40 share 14.3% 15.1% 15.3% 15.2% 17.0%
Rural only (N: 38 256)
Gini 0.485 0.475 0.448 0.453 0.369
P90/10 10.46 10.18 8.08 8.39 5.01
P40 share 12.1% 12.4% 14.0% 13.7% 18.4%
Note: Figures refer to annual per capita household income of 2014.
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Table 10: Sensitivity of changes in inequality along income concepts
Indicator Gross Net Disposable Post-ﬁscal Extended
V2: Public pensions treated as deferred income
Gini 0.472 0.454 0.446 0.447 0.406
P90/10 11.55 10.67 9.39 9.46 6.67
V3: EsSalud contributions borne fully by employer
Gini 0.469 0.454 0.446 0.447 0.406
P90/10 11.07 10.54 9.39 9.46 6.67
V4: Health in-kind beneﬁts valuated by actual-use approach
Gini 0.473 0.454 0.446 0.447 0.400
P90/10 11.39 10.54 9.39 9.46 6.29
V5: Public pensions as income, EsSalud borne by employer, health as actual use
Gini 0.468 0.450 0.442 0.443 0.395
P90/10 11.21 10.35 9.10 9.17 6.10
Note: Figures refer to adult equivalent income of 2014 (combined scale). The speciﬁcation of income
concepts follow our benchmark analysis in all points except for the one described for each speciﬁcation.
Table 11: Conﬁdence intervals of estimated Gini coeﬃcients from table 4
Gini Std. Err. 95% CI N
Gross 0.4730 0.0056 0.4618 0.4842 116059
Net 0.4541 0.0050 0.4442 0.4639 116059
Disposable 0.4458 0.0047 0.4366 0.4551 116064
Post-ﬁscal 0.4471 0.0048 0.4376 0.4567 116056
Extended 0.4063 0.0055 0.3954 0.4173 116056
Urban areas
Gross 0.4296 0.0058 0.4181 0.4410 77803
Net 0.4098 0.0052 0.3995 0.4202 77803
Disposable 0.4042 0.0052 0.3938 0.4146 77808
Post-ﬁscal 0.4056 0.0056 0.3945 0.4167 77712
Extended 0.3743 0.0054 0.3635 0.3851 77806
Rural areas
Gross 0.4691 0.0081 0.4529 0.4852 38256
Net 0.4589 0.0073 0.4443 0.4735 38256
Disposable 0.4289 0.0077 0.4135 0.4443 38256
Post-ﬁscal 0.4338 0.0075 0.4190 0.4487 38219
Extended 0.3549 0.0066 0.3418 0.3680 38250
Note: Standard errors have been estimated through bootstrapping (100 repli-
cations).
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Appendix C Constructing health insurance values
To construct the value for public health insurance, we rely on information about the costs
and usage of diﬀerent health services from detailed actuarial studies for SIS (SIS, 2015)
and EsSalud (Grushka, 2016). The studies calculate the actuarial costs of coverage under
the beneﬁt plan PEAS deﬁned in the Law on Universal Health Insurance (AUS). EsSalud
additionally covers a range of economic beneﬁts that cover the events of incapacity, ma-
ternity, nursing and funeral support. Although detailed information on health use by age,
gender and type of service are available, the studies report only average costs per aﬃliate.
To diﬀerentiate premiums by risk groups, we calculate relative risk factors for population
subgroups and multiply these with the average premium per aﬃliate.
We ﬁrst calculate health cost proﬁles that diﬀer by gender and age group (5-year
brackets up to age 80, and a group of age 80+). We combine information on the average
number of cases per service by subgroup with average costs per service. Clients of SIS
receive services from public health posts and clinics that are operated by the decentralized
Ministry of Health (MINSA), where SIS contracts the services from. MINSA has the
largest network of facilities that are located throughout the country. EsSalud in turn
operates own clinics and health facilities that are mainly located in cities and departmental
capitals, since EsSalud provides insurance to formal sector workers which mainly reside in
urban centers (Giedion et al., 2014). Health costs are available for 6 types of services
(consultation, emergency, hospitalization, surgery, preventive care, hemodialysis and in
the case of EsSalud additionally beneﬁts related to incapacity, maternity, nursing support
and funeral support) that diﬀer by department in the case of SIS. We thus obtain an
average cost proﬁle by age and gender. This covers medical costs of the insurance but not
administrative or other non-service costs. We calculate risk factors as the ratio of subgroup
cost proﬁle and average service cost per aﬃliate. We apply this risk factor to the average









Where IP stands for insurance premium, the subscripts g, a, and d stand for gender, age
group and department respectively, HS stands for the number of k types of health services
used that diﬀer by price P and in the case of SIS by department. Total Costs refer to
total insurance cost per aﬃliate while Service Cost refer only to the share of total costs
that accrue to medical service provision. For ease of notation, we drop the superscript for
the two diﬀerent health insurance schemes since we apply the same formula to both with
the exception that the EsSalud premium does not diﬀer by department d.
The average cost per aﬃliate is priced at PEN 529 by EsSalud and PEN 360 by SIS.
Our insurance premiums range from between PEN 150 to PEN 1600 for EsSalud and
between around PEN 60 and PEN 1600 for SIS depending on the individual risk group
(the average spending per aﬃliate is very low in some departments compared to others).
For both schemes, the average costs calculated by the funds are below what they charge
individuals that opt to insure voluntarily with either scheme. EsSalud charges annually
between PEN 768 for an individual and PEN 2736 for a household of four. SIS charges
between PEN 468 for an individual and PEN 1380 for a family of four. This discrepancy
may be due to various reasons. A higher premium may be a way of generating revenues:
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SIS has been seriously underfunded since its inception, and recent legislatory changes un-
dermine the ﬁnancial sustainability of EsSalud, too (OECD, 2017a). In practice, voluntary
insurance is only used by less than 2% of the population. Another reason may be that
ineﬃciencies are built into the pricing mechanisms of insurance policies but not into the
costing of individual services.
So far, the calculated insurance value relies on the assumption that PEAS is imple-
mented as stipulated by law. In practice, however, SIS is seriously underfunded. Its funding
comes from general taxation and its budget is established in negotiation with the Ministry
of Economy and Finance (MEF) as part of the annual budgetary process. While SIS has
calculated a mean expected cost of PEN 360 per year, its average expenditure per aﬃliate
only reached PEN 71 in 2014 (OECD, 2017a), hence a mere 20%. The funding shortage
results in service rationing, informal fees and (illegal) copayments (Francke, 2013). To
account for this discrepancy, we scale down the insurance value accordingly. Since we
lack disaggregated expenditure by department, we assume service rationing to aﬀect all
aﬃliates proportionately.
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